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A B S T R A C T
Switzerland is usually not looked upon as a substantial economic actor in Africa.
Taking Zambian copper as a case study, we show how important Swiss companies
have become in the global commodities trade and the services it depends on.
While big Swiss trading ﬁrms such as Glencore and Traﬁgura have generated
increasing scholarly and public interest, a multitude of Swiss companies is involved
in logistics and transport of Zambian copper. Swiss extractivism, we argue, is a model
case for trends in today’s global capitalism. We highlight that serviciﬁcation, a crucial
element of African mining regimes today, creates new and more ﬂexible opportun-
ities for international companies to capture value in global production networks.
These opportunities partly rely on business-friendly regulation and tax regimes in
Northern countries, a fact which makes companies potentially vulnerable to
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reputation risks and offers opportunities to civil society actors criticising their role.
New and different Swiss–Zambian connections emerge from civil society networks
organising around companies’ economic activities.
I N T R O D U C T I O N : E X T R A C T I V I S M
This essay is on the economic infrastructure of extractivism and its role in global
capitalism. When analysing extractivism – a reliance of countries on the export
of raw materials that creates economic and political dependence and redirects
proﬁts to other countries (Acosta ; Gudynas ), social scientists often
focus on the sites of extraction: on mines, oil ﬁelds or plantations. In African
studies, the topic has attracted renewed interest since China’s economic
growth changed the landscape of global extraction and generated a new wave
of large-scale commodity investments (Womin ; Ayelazuno ; Dobler
; Engels & Dietz ; Schubert et al. ). Scholars have shown the
role played by multinational companies and their managers (Lee ) and
have analysed the relations between large investors, host communities and gov-
ernments of resource-rich countries (Kesselring a). Environmental pro-
blems have found as much coverage as resettlement programmes, corporate
social responsibility measures or labour relations (Kirsch ; Welker ;
Benya ; Dolan & Rajak ). These studies have shown commodity extrac-
tion’s enormous impact on people who live around the mines and oil ﬁelds, and
have linked this impact to power relations in the global economy.
The political economy of extractivism, however, cannot be understood by
concentrating on pits and wells alone. Between their extraction and their use
in global industrial production, commodities have to be ﬁnanced, insured,
moved, stored, cleaned, weighed, blended, bought, sold, certiﬁed, tracked –
to mention just a few downstream activities. Service providers such as trading
ﬁrms, transport and shipping companies, ﬁnancial institutions, certiﬁcation
and software providers are as important agents of commodity extraction as
mining companies. These segments of global production networks ﬁgure less
prominently in the literature. The ensuing imbalance distorts our image of
the ways in which commodity-exporting countries are embedded into the
global economy.
Using the relations between Zambia and Switzerland as an example, we show
in this article how active international companies are in providing the infrastruc-
ture of Southern Africa’s mineral extraction, and how they manage to capture a
substantial percentage of the value created by it. We argue that in order to
understand the consequences of mineral extraction for host countries and
ultimately increase local beneﬁts through regulation and effective taxation,
we need to pay much more attention to these less spectacular, but no less
proﬁtable activities.
We are not the ﬁrst to argue along these lines. Scholars of global value chains
have long been interested in the different ways value is added to goods along
their journey (Gerefﬁ ), while theorists of global production networks
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highlight the functional role of intermediaries such as ﬁnancial, logistics and
standard-setting agents (Yeung & Coe : , ). More recently, a new
focus on the ‘serviciﬁcation’ of global value chains has made clear that manufac-
turing ﬁrms in advanced economies frequently generate a high percentage of
their revenue through service provision (Miroudot ). Most studies on ser-
viciﬁcation, however, have focused on industries in Europe, the USA and Asia,
and little is known about the extent to which services contribute to value add-
ition in mineral extraction in African countries. We hope that our article
draws attention to this gap and increases interest in the less spectacular sides
of commodity extraction.
Our case study is restricted in focus: we analyse the role of Swiss companies in
Zambia’s copper sector. We concentrate on one commodity and one pair of
countries, and we only include activities downstream of mining that take
place in Southern Africa.
Zambia, currently the world’s th largest producer of copper, is highly
dependent on mining. The extractive sector accounts directly for %, indir-
ectly for up to % of its GDP, and for % () of exports. Despite this,
mining only contributed % to government revenue in , the largest
part coming from mineral royalties (Zambia EITI ).
According to ofﬁcial trade statistics, half of Zambia’s copper is exported to
Switzerland – that is, bought and sold by Swiss commodity trading ﬁrms. This
is typical of Switzerland’s role in the global economy. The country has devel-
oped into a global trade hub; % of the world’s metals, % of coffee, %
of sugar, % of grains and % of crude oil are today traded via Switzerland
(Lannen et al. ).
When we started our research, we wanted to better understand the conse-
quences of Switzerland’s role as a trade hub for Zambian copper. We soon rea-
lised that commodity trade is just one of the ways the Swiss and the Zambian
economy are interlinked. In our description and analysis of these links, we do
not want to single out Swiss companies as exceptional, and we see the danger
that the national focus could downplay global connections of capital. We will
show, however, that a focus on Switzerland makes the general dynamics of
global capitalism more clearly visible. It is a useful heuristic tool for understand-
ing regional disparities and value capture in global capitalism.
Methodically, the article draws on ethnographic research in border and
mining towns in Southern Africa. Gregor Dobler has worked in this context
for the last  years and has done short-term ﬁeldwork for this article in
Chirundu and Lusaka; Rita Kesselring has conducted  months of ethno-
graphic ﬁeldwork in Solwezi and Kalumbila, two new mining towns in north-
western Zambia, and, to a lesser degree, in Mufulira and Kitwe, two old
Copperbelt towns. We both have conducted interviews with a wide range of
industry actors in Zambia and Switzerland, and done extensive desk research
for areas in which we found access difﬁcult.
The article’s structure is simple. After a short introductory overview, we follow
copper’s journey through the main stages of mining, trade and transport
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logistics. At each stage, we show the extent and manner of Swiss companies’
involvement. A second, shorter part then looks at a different link between the
countries emerging from their economic interactions: solidarity movements
between civil society groups. We show that for companies who use favourable
regulatory environments as a major asset, such critical movements have
become a strategic risk and standard-setting agents in themselves. In the conclu-
sion, we bring these strands together to theorise the role of Swiss companies in
the global partition of labour.
E X T R A C T I O N
Our interest not in mining alone but in copper’s entire production network is
one of the few things we share with Glencore, the best-known Swiss company
active in Zambia’s copper sector. Glencore started out as a commodity trader,
but has by now become an integrated multinational commodity ﬁrm. One
major step in this direction has been its investment in copper mines in
Zambia and the DRC since . Glencore’s decision to buy mines in Zambia
was anticyclical and, in retrospect, came at the best possible moment for the
company.
Zambia has had a long history of commercial copper extraction. Under the
British South Africa Company’s and later British colonial rule, its copper
mines were owned by the Anglo American Corporation and the Roan
Selection Trust. In , ﬁve years after independence, the Zambian govern-
ment nationalised the country’s copper mines. In , in response to a long
depression in copper prices beginning in the mid-s, the two state-owned
mining enterprises were amalgamated to create Zambia Consolidated Copper
Mines Limited (ZCCM). ZCCM’s main shareholders were the Zambian govern-
ment with .% and the Anglo American Corporation with .%. The con-
solidation could not stop the sector’s decline. In an environment of global
liberalisation and deregulation, increasing external debts and lack of revenue
forced President Kaunda to give in to pressure by the International Monetary
Fund, the World Bank and other lenders to privatise the mines and other
state assets (Simutanyi ; Craig ).
The scope and the pace of the country’s privatisation and liberalisation
program increased under the Movement for Multi-Party Democracy (MMD)
led by Frederick Chiluba (Fraser & Larmer ). In , the Zambian gov-
ernment began unbundling ZCCM into asset packages and selling those to
various investors, while maintaining a minority interest in each new company.
Due to the global price slump of the s, it took until  before all assets
were privatised, after years of hard negotiations, low bids and increased debt.
Glencore acquired a majority stake in Mopani copper mines, the largest
employer on the Copperbelt – comprising Nkana and Mufulira mines, two con-
centrators, one smelter, one reﬁnery and two cobalt plants. In , Carlisa
Investments Corp, a joint venture between First Quantum Minerals Limited
(FQM, see below) and Glencore International AG incorporated in the British
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Virgin Islands, acquired a % share in Mopani. Very soon, FQM diluted its
interest in the company, which reduced its shares in the Mopani copper
mines from .% to .% and increased Glencore’s from .% to .%.
The remaining % are still owned by ZCCM (FQM ).
As with all ZCCM assets, conditions for the sale of Mopani were codiﬁed in a
secret bilateral Development Agreement later leaked to the public. The agree-
ment deﬁned a ‘stability period’ of  years during which contractual condi-
tions would remain stable. It exempted Glencore and FQM from covering
ZCCM’s ﬁnancial liabilities (including pensions for ZCCM workers) and envir-
onmental legacies, and from paying most taxes (Adam & Simpasa : –).
Although the development agreements ceased to be binding following their
cancellation in the Mines and Minerals Development Act , many of their
provisions remain in place.
Today, Glencore is the fourth largest copper producer by output in Zambia
after FQM, Barrick Gold and Vedanta. It also owns Sable Zinc Kabwe Limited,
a copper and cobalt processing plant in Kabwe (Glencore : ),
Mutanda mine and .% of Katanga Mining in neighbouring DRC.
Glencore’s Swiss history is well known. The company goes back to Marc Rich
& Co AG, registered in Zug, Switzerland in . Rich, by then on the FBI’s 
most wanted fugitives list for charges of, among others, tax evasion, racketeering
and evading US sanctions in trading with Iran, sold his trading business to the
company’s managers in . (He was later famously pardoned by Bill
Clinton on his last day in ofﬁce, after Rich’s wife Denise Rich had donated
more than US$  million to the Democratic Party.) The new company,
Glencore, went public in  and merged with Swiss mining giant Xstrata in
/. Today, it is the world’s largest commodity trading company.
Glencore plc is incorporated in Jersey and domiciled in Baar, Switzerland.
Shareholders in Glencore plc include institutional investors, such as Qatar
Holding (.%) and BlackRock Inc. (.%), but large shares in the
company are owned by managers, e.g. CEO Ivan Glasenberg (.%) and
Aristotelis Mistakidis (.%) (Glencore : –).
Since the s, Glencore was one of the ﬁrst major commodity traders to
extend its reach along the value chain – a strategy now followed by many of
the industry’s giants, since margins from arbitrage have declined in an age of
more readily available pricing information (Bloomberg ). Its expansion
into mining has generated many discussions – some of them linked to the eco-
nomic beneﬁts or dangers of vertical integration, others to the business prac-
tices or environmental effects of its mines and smelters. Employees of other
Zambian mining companies we spoke to see Glencore as driven by a different,
non-mining logic (see also Lee : ), while employees of other Swiss
trading companies see Glencore as an opaque and somewhat shady behemoth.
Global copper prices rose six-fold after Glencore’s acquisition of Mopani,
from US$, per metric ton in  to over US$, per ton in
February . After , the price gradually fell to below US $, in
, only to recover to US$,–, at the moment of writing. Due to
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the privatisation of mining assets and an unfavourable tax regime, little of the
ensuing proﬁt remained in the country. The government’s multiple attempts
to increase revenues frommining have largely failed due to companies’ bargain-
ing power (Manley ; Saunders & Caramento : –).
T R A D E
Mining companies based in Zambia do not use copper for production purposes,
but sell their product to other companies. Mines rarely sell copper directly to
economic actors who need physical copper for production. Instead, copper
passes into the hands of specialised traders who sell it on to other traders or con-
sumers. Traders have a double role. On the one hand, they render services to
producers and consumers by allocating copper more cost-efﬁciently than
either consumers or producers could do on their own. Traders have access to
a large number of producers and consumers and can save on transport costs
by matching supply and demand across different regions of the world; they
ﬁnance transport and storage of commodities, allowing producers and consu-
mers to optimise cash ﬂow and save costs; and they can more efﬁciently
hedge against market risks than smaller actors could, keeping costs for other
actors stable and predictable. For these services, they receive a share of the pro-
duction network’s overall proﬁts. This share is, at least in textbook economic
theory, smaller than the costs the other actors in the production network
would have without the traders – otherwise customers would circumvent them
and source their copper directly from the mines. Trading ﬁrms thus ideally
make the production network more efﬁcient. If their business is centred on
the allocation element of trade, trading ﬁrms typically make relatively small,
but predictable proﬁts on each transaction. Their proﬁts add up from high
volumes rather than from high margins.
On the other hand, trading ﬁrms engage in speculative trade to increase their
own proﬁts. They try to anticipate price developments and bet against the
markets. In this side of their business, traders are not the agents of either pro-
ducers or consumers, but act for the interest of capital owners (and their own
bonuses). Traders argue that much speculative trade is in the interest of all
market participants, since it contributes to fair pricing and overall price stability.
Critics however point out that speculative trade creates high risks and contri-
butes to a concentration of proﬁts in the hands of big capital owners while exter-
nalising market risks to less powerful investors.
The Swiss trading hub
While mining and, to a lesser degree, industrial production is strictly localised,
commodities can be bought and sold independently of their physical location.
This has allowed Switzerland, a landlocked country without many natural
resources, to become one of the most important hubs of global commodity
trade (Haller ).
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Switzerland has a long history of trade and has often proﬁted from trade with
African commodities – from slaves (Fässler ) to cocoa and coffee. Partly
growing from such earlier roots, Swiss commodity trade has taken off to a surprising
degree over the last two decades, surviving the ﬁnancial crisis unscathed (Beusch
et al. ). Switzerland generated .% of its GDP in  from commodity
trading – a higher share than banking or tourism (Lannen et al. ). In ,
the ﬁve largest Swiss companies by turnover were commodity traders: Glencore,
Vitol, Traﬁgura, Cargill and Mercuria Energy Trading. The sector has recently
drawn the attention of scholars, activists and regulators (Erklärung von Bern
; Interdepartmental Platform on Commodities ; Public Eye ) but
even in Switzerland, its importance is still barely known outside of specialist circles.
A number of factors have combined to turn Switzerland into a commodity
trading hub. The country has all the infrastructure traders need. Quick and
secure access to ﬁnance and insurance, excellent virtual and physical global con-
nections, a vibrant shipping industry, trader-friendly regulations, the proximity to
international standard setters (most importantly the different UN organisations
and the plethora of international lobby groups in Geneva), a highly skilled work-
force, a ﬂexible labour market and a very low corporate tax rate are just the most
important factors here. Swiss neutrality and its non-membership of the UN until
 was another crucial element, since it allowed companies to engage in
trade with countries under UN sanctions, such as apartheid South Africa or Iran.
A great many international commodity traders have their headquarters in
Switzerland today. Their variety is huge – from the integrated mining and
trading behemoth Glencore to large specialised trading houses like Gunvor
or Cargill to trading divisions of banks and investment ﬁrms to small independ-
ent traders. About half of the roughly  trading ﬁrms have fewer than 
employees, % have more than  employees. The overall number of
employees in the sector is probably between , to , (Eggert et al.
; Public Eye & Missbach ).
What role do these Swiss trading companies play in the global production
network of Zambian copper? Export statistics offer a ﬁrst approximation.
According to UN Comtrade ﬁgures, around –% of Zambian copper has
been exported to Switzerland in every year between  and . These sta-
tistics substantially under-report the percentage of copper traded by Swiss ﬁrms,
since transit trade is difﬁcult to classify in customs statistics. Zambian customs
usually classify copper exports according to destination countries (i.e. the
country to which the goods are shipped). Only when no ﬁnal destination is
known at the time of the sale, is the buyer’s country recorded instead.
Zambian copper bought by Swiss traders is never shipped to Switzerland.
Much of it is sold in transit, often from bonded warehouses. This copper will
be recorded as exported to Switzerland; copper bought by Swiss companies
and shipped to a known third country will be recorded as exported to this
third country. When, for example, a Swiss trading company has an offtake agree-
ment with a Zambian mining company and supplies half of this copper to a ﬁrm
in China while it sells the other half from a bonded warehouse in Johannesburg,
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half of the copper bought at the mine will be recorded as exported to China,
half as exported to Switzerland – even though all of it has been traded by a
Swiss company. The percentage of Zambian copper traded by Swiss companies
is thus probably much higher than the export ﬁgures show.
Swiss trading ﬁrms in Zambia
To understand how this trade is carried out, we use Glencore and Metal Corp
Trading as two different examples. We will cover Traﬁgura, another big com-
modity trader, in the section on copper transport.
Glencore’s mines market much of their copper to Glencore’s trading seg-
ments, most likely through Glencore UK. In addition, the trading division of
the company buys copper extracted by other mines in Zambia and the DRC.
Since Glencore’s mining and smelting operations are difﬁcult to hide and the
company has a deservedly bad reputation, it is under relatively close scrutiny
by NGOs and the press.
Other Swiss traders generally remain invisible to all but industry insiders. First
Quantum Minerals’ trading arm Metal Corp Trading AG (Switzerland) is a case
in point. First Quantum Minerals (FQM), headquartered in Canada, is the
biggest copper mining company in Zambia. Its Kansanshi mine and the new
Trident project produce about a third of Zambia’s copper. In its Annual
Information Forms, FQM claims that it has ‘a limited number of off-takers’
(e.g. FQM : ). This is something of an understatement. FQM sells all
of its copper to just two other companies: Traﬁgura, long headquartered in
Geneva, and Metal Corp Trading registered in Zug.
Metal Corp goes back to Republic House, a company registered in Zug in
 and mostly made up of traders who had worked for MRI, another Swiss
trading company. Republic House was owned at least since  by Energem
Resources, an old player in the Southern African mining sector. (Founded as
DiamondWorks, it had changed its name in  after allegations of blood
diamond dealings.) In preparation for a full takeover of Republic House by
FQM in , Energem founded Metal Corp Trading AG in Zug (Wikileaks
; Metal Bulletin a; b). Today, the company is a fully owned sub-
sidiary of Metal Corp (Sweden) AB, itself a fully owned subsidiary of FQM.
In short, FQM’s Zambian mining company sells its copper to FQM’s Swiss
trading company. In fact, Metal Corp Trading ‘buys and sells all of FQM’s
metals and, in the process, carries out sophisticated derivatives management
to handle price risk’ (Mineman ). While the company has a brass plaque
and a letter box in Zug, its main business is carried out through ofﬁces in
London’s Great Portland Street housed in the same building as First
Quantum Minerals Ltd’s UK headquarters.
For Metal Corp’s trading arrangements, Switzerland is not important as a
physical place. The copper it buys and sells does not reach the country. Its
traders are not working on the shores of Lake Zug; perhaps not even the
proﬁts are stored in Swiss banks. ‘Switzerland’ is a regulatory regime to which
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Metal Corp rents access by paying the minimal fee of Zug’s taxes. This virtual
Switzerland of course intersects with the physical place. Many other trading
companies have a much larger physical footprint in Switzerland, but for all of
them, access to the Swiss regulatory regime is a primary asset.
T R A N S P O R T A N D L O G I S T I C S
Transport
Virtually all Zambian copper is exported on container ships from the harbours
of Durban (South Africa), Walvis Bay (Namibia), Dar es Salaam (Tanzania) and
Beira (Mozambique). On its way – usually by road – from the mines and smel-
ters to warehouses and harbours, it has to cross at least one, often several
national boundaries. Truckers and owners have to deal with difﬁcult road con-
ditions, frequent congestion and border delays, and sometimes theft.
Since copper is costly to transport on land, shipping costs to the harbours are
a crucial factor for pricing and proﬁts. Today, copper’s world market prices are
very transparent, and opportunities for arbitrage become scarcer with the omni-
presence of electronic media and reporting, so that proﬁts made on the ﬁgura-
tive ‘ﬁrst and last mile’ become increasingly important for traders’ income
(Franke et al. : ). Here – in Zambian trucking, in warehousing, in cross-
border paperwork –, presence on the ground, local knowledge and good con-
nections to both local authorities and cross-border actors are indispensable
(Dobler ), and information about transport costs is much less transparent
than information about copper market prices. Consequently, some global com-
modity traders increasingly invest in the entire transport chain in order to
become independent from logistics companies and gain control over proﬁts
in these crucial segments (Pirrong : ). Swiss companies are no excep-
tion. While Glencore has mainly invested in trucking companies transporting
copper from DRC, Traﬁgura has moved into warehousing on the one hand,
the upstream petrol logistics fuelling all transport on the other (see below).
Glencore uses the trucking company Muzuri Sana to transport copper from its
Mutanda mine in DRC to warehouses in Zambia. This company, according to
Zambian interview partners, is a joint venture between Mutanda and Hakuna
Matata, the trucking business owned by former Katanga governor, mining
mogul and opposition presidential candidate Moïse Katumbi. (In a very similar
arrangement, neighbouring Tenke Fungurume Mine transports its copper to
Zambia using Habari Kani trucking, also co-owned by Hakuna Matata.)
These companies transport copper and cobalt from DRC’s Katanga Province to
Zambia through Kasumbalesa border post. They ofﬂoad in the Zambian
Copperbelt and take mining supplies back to the DRC. Subsequent transport
from the Copperbelt to the harbours is handled by different companies. The
main reason for this arrangement is the difﬁculty of transporting goods through
the DRC. Legally, commodities extracted in the DRC have to be transported by
companies registered in the DRC using Congolese drivers. More importantly,
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truck drivers we spoke to indicated they needed a lot of local knowledge and con-
nections to navigate controls onDRC roads – a rather different set of qualiﬁcations
than that which is needed for the routes to Gauteng or Dar es Salaam.
Swiss companies’ role in transport does not stop at the harbours. Although
Switzerland does not have any seaports, the world’s second biggest container
shipper, Mediterranean Shipping Company (MSC), is headquartered in
Geneva. Along with its competitors Maersk and CMA-CGM, the company is
an important player in copper shipments from Southern African harbours.
All three companies offer through bill of lading services for Zambia, but since
copper transport can usually be planned ahead and is highly routinised, most
shippers prefer to organise their own transport, so that vessel owners like
MSC only come into play at the harbour terminal.
Warehousing
Warehousing is an integral part of logistics management. In earlier years, Zambian
copper was usually stored on the mine grounds waiting to be shipped. Today,
copper is mostly shipped immediately after production and stored in bonded ware-
houses in the Copperbelt or in neighbouring countries. Many of these warehouses
are operated by international logistics companies. To these companies, ware-
houses are crucial for optimising truck and rail loads, for storage, repacking and
blending and to regulate cash ﬂows by storing and releasing value.
In Zambia, most international logistics companies concentrate their efforts
on the route to one speciﬁc harbour. J&J for example, a Mozambican
company, concentrates on transport to Beira, while the French logistics giant
Bolloré specialises in the route to Durban. The main Swiss player in the
sector is Impala Terminals, Traﬁgura’s logistics arm. Impala has heavily invested
in infrastructure along the Kolwezi–Lubumbashi–Ndola–Dar es Salaam corri-
dor. The company operates the largest single-customer terminal in Dar es
Salaam harbour and uses its resources to channel copper transports to Dar
(and to inﬂuence trade policies in Tanzania, including taxation and rail devel-
opment). The company owns bonded warehouses in Kolwezi, Lubumbashi,
Ndola and Dar, all of which have road and rail connections and can handle
 ft and  ft containers as well as break-bulk. Along the road to Dar es
Salaam, Impala has constructed dedicated truck stops as safe stopping points
for copper transports (Impala Terminals : ).
In addition to serving Traﬁgura’s own transports, its Ndola warehouse is an
important hub for third-party copper transports from DRC and Zambia to
Walvis Bay and Durban. The same is true for the second newly constructed
copper warehouse, Bolloré’s Chingola hub. Its main purpose is to serve as an
entrepot for DRC copper and as the meeting point for the southern and nor-
thern ﬂeets of trucks. This US$  million investment opened in May 
and today handles around , tons of copper, cobalt and mining reagents
per year. In addition to its warehouses, trucks and terminals, Bolloré is also the
biggest clearing agent in Zambia for third party shipments (Bolloré ).
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Most haulage, whether by road or rail, is still done by Southern African com-
panies such as BHL, J&J or GSM – some registered in Zambia, others in South
Africa, Namibia or Mozambique. The strict contract conditions for copper trans-
ports can only be met by large transport companies, who usually own and
operate a few hundred trucks. Copper cathode is transported to warehouses
on either ﬂatbed or container trucks, while transports to the harbours are exclu-
sively done in containers to avoid reloading. (Before being loaded into contain-
ers, copper transported on ﬂatbed trucks has to be washed, a service not all
warehouses can offer (Smal ).) Transport contracts usually insist on
convoys, GPS tracking and armed security personnel.
Fuel
Just like excavators and mine trucks, trucks and diesel trains need fuel.
Supplying fuel to Zambia and the neighbouring countries is an integral part
of copper logistics, and one in which a Swiss company plays an important
role. Traﬁgura holds a % stake in Puma Energy, one of the most important
distribution companies for petrol products in Southern Africa.
Puma has been controversial from the start, especially with respect to its
Angolan investment. Twenty-eight per cent of the company, which owns most
of Angola’s downstream petrol business, is in the hands of Sonangol, the
Angolan state oil company; another % is owned by Chochan Holdings, a
company founded and owned by General Leopoldino (‘Dino’) Fragoso do
Nascimento, one of the wealthiest and best-connected Angolan businesspeo-
ple-cum-politicians. In , the company bought stakes in the BP stations in
Namibia (%), Botswana (%), Zambia (%), Malawi (%) and
Tanzania (%) and took over a huge storage depot in Walvis Bay. In ,
Puma Energy Africa Holdings acquired a % stake in the Zimbabwean
company Sakunda Energy, a monopolistic fuel distribution company founded
by Kudakwashe Tagwirei, a well-connected businessman with close ties to the
Zimbabwean military. Through Sakunda, Puma controls the Feruka pipeline
between its storage facilities in Beira and Harare, which has become a major pol-
itical issue in the conﬂict between President Mnangagwa and the military
(Africa Conﬁdential a).
Most recently, Traﬁgura through DTS, a / joint venture between
Traﬁgura and General Dino’s Cochan, has invested towards the reopening of
a crucial train route from Kolwezi in the DRC to Lobito harbour in Angola
(Zambia Chamber of Mines ). Puma, of course, is not the only petrol
company in these countries, but a good part of copper transports, whatever
the shipping company, indirectly proﬁts Traﬁgura.
Testing, certiﬁcation and surveillance
Another very important, but often overlooked element in logistics is the certiﬁ-
cation and surveillance of goods. Traders often do not themselves have the
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possibility to assess the quality of the goods they buy and sell. Banks ﬁnancing
trade deals have to know their securities are worth as much as the debtor
claims. Insurance companies have to make sure the insurance cover corre-
sponds to the goods’ value. Buyers want to ensure that products match their spe-
ciﬁcations before having them shipped. State agencies evaluate royalties
according to metal content. In all these instances, independent inspection
and veriﬁcation services increase trust and enable anonymous transactions.
Perhaps not surprisingly, one of the biggest inspection companies is based in
Switzerland: SGS (formerly Société Générale de Surveillance). SGS has a large
footprint across the world, certifying everything from hazelnut spreads to
nuclear plants, from labour rights to metal content and from fair trade to
food safety. Through its involvement in industry bodies and multi-stakeholder
initiatives, it is one of the most important private standard setters in the
global economy (Peters et al. ; Bartley ). The company is active in
many African countries. It runs Uganda’s vehicle inspection, operates weigh-
bridges, electronic cargo tracking services and import veriﬁcation services for
the Kenyan government and supervises road contractors in Senegal.
In Zambia, SGS owns a laboratory in the small Copperbelt town of Kalulushi
that many mines rely on for ore testing; Glencore, for example, uses the lab for
the samples of Katanga Mining (Katanga Mining : , ). Similar SGS
laboratories operate in South Africa. Even more importantly, SGS supervises
container packing in warehouses in South Africa and Tanzania and certiﬁes
their content. This service is crucial for trade, insurance and ﬁnancing, and
along with its competitors Alfred H. Knight and Alex Stewart, SGS is one of
the most important players in Africa and the world. All three companies are
also among the listed samplers of the London Metal Exchange.
Customs
A ﬁnal Swiss input into the Zambian parts of copper’s global production
network needs at least to be mentioned: every good that is imported into or
exported from Zambia, be it machinery, copper, sulphuric acid or oranges, is
processed through a Swiss service export. Like most countries in the world,
Zambia uses Asycuda (Automated System for Customs Data, currently
Asycuda World) to process all customs documents. This integrated customs
management software has been developed by UNCTAD in Geneva. It is one
of the least known, but most important technical media of trade facilitation
and standardisation. In a cloud-based service running on servers in Lusaka,
transporters, clearing agents and shippers can electronically enter shipments
for customs (pre-)clearance. In spite of many problems, mostly linked to
server downtime, the use of Asycuda has signiﬁcantly improved workﬂows and
transparency of Zambian customs and greatly shortened processing times at
the borders. It provides the state with the necessary instruments to collect
revenue and gather accurate trade data, it eases ﬁnancing and insurance and
allows transporters and owners better control over their shipments. The
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software is thus a crucial factor in reducing transport costs and increasing
efﬁciency, and neither transport corridors nor one-stop border posts would
really work without it.
This might sound universally benign, but it also creates important and under-
studied distribution effects. Lower transport costs change the distribution of
proﬁts within the global production network: beneﬁts for producing and con-
suming countries are generated by decreasing revenues in mining and transit
countries. For resource exporting countries, they might well contribute to a
further externalisation of proﬁts, which would have to be offset by taxes or roy-
alties in order to ﬁnance the infrastructure on which they rely.
C H A L L E N G E S T O S W I S S E X T R A C T I V I S M : C I V I L S O C I E T Y A C T O R S I N
Z A M B I A A N D S W I T Z E R L A N D
So far, we have looked at the surprising importance of Swiss corporate actors in a
few segments of the global production network of Zambian copper. We have
focused on corporate power and on the capacity of Swiss companies to
capture value, points to which we will come back in more detail in the
conclusion.
The image of Swiss extractivism would be incomplete without including the
public climate in which companies operate. CSOs, NGOs, politicians (and some-
times researchers) have the potential to inﬂuence what value companies can
and cannot capture, and they form a crucial part of the environment in
which companies take strategic decisions. The public climate in both Zambia
and Switzerland has become increasingly critical towards commodity extraction,
but regulation in Switzerland is still largely favourable for international
companies.
The different cantons in Switzerland compete in the national and inter-
national race for the lowest corporate tax rates. The global average for taxes
on earnings, capital tax and property tax combined is %; the Swiss average
is .%, while some cantons stay below % (BAK Economics ). This is
an important incentive for companies to move to Switzerland and to optimise
taxes by shifting proﬁts into the country (Cobham et al. ; Public Eye
). For international mining companies, intra-ﬁrm trade with Swiss
branches can be an important avenue to lower the tax burden and increase
shareholder proﬁts. This increases the difﬁculties of commodity exporting
countries to effectively tax extractive industries (Moore et al. ). Traﬁgura
Group, for example, gives its effective global tax rate in  as .%
(Traﬁgura Group Pte ).
It is notoriously difﬁcult to evaluate whether all tax optimisation strategies are
legal. In April , the Swiss NGO Berne Declaration (today Public Eye) jointly
with other international NGOs ﬁled a formal complaint with the OECD against
Glencore and FQM for alleged breaching of OECD Guidelines (OECDWatch
). The complaint was based on a  audit report conducted on behalf
of the Zambian authorities (GrantThornton ). It alleged that FQM’s
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subsidiary Mopani Copper Mines manipulated its ﬁnancial accounts in order to
reduce its tax bill by overestimation of operating costs, underestimation of pro-
duction volumes, transfer pricing manipulation and breach of the ‘arm’s
length’ principle. The OECD’s Swiss National Contact Point (NCP) handled
the complaint and facilitated mediation. The result was disappointing to civil
society actors. As described in the NCP’s ﬁnal statement in November ,
the parties could only ‘agree to disagree’ – and even this agreement remains
conﬁdential.
In spite of its limited success, the example is typical for contemporary chal-
lenges to extractivism. The opposition to a company’s alleged wrongdoings
did not emerge from the states’ regulating authorities, but from civil society
actors who perceive themselves as ethics watchdogs in relation to global com-
panies. By increasing reputational and regulatory risks, civil society actors can
change business strategies and value capture (Yeung & Coe ; Wright
). They do not remain outside of global production networks, but can
become an important force shaping them.
In Switzerland, public consciousness of the economic and political weight of
the commodity trade sector as well as of its problematic aspects has been
growing over recent years. The Swiss public receives more information about
corporate misconduct by Swiss companies in other countries than ever
before. A focal point is the referendum initiative ‘Responsible Business
Initiative’ started by an alliance of over  NGOs, CSOs and churches
(Humanrights.ch ). The initiative seeks to make global compliance with
environmental and human rights standards legally mandatory for all bigger
companies, and to introduce the right to appeal to Swiss courts in cases of vio-
lation. It is based on the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights
from , which the Swiss Federal Council only implemented as voluntary
recommendations. At the time of writing, both chambers of the Swiss parlia-
ment have struck down a scaled-down counterproposal, which most likely
means that the Swiss people will vote on the referendum initiative in .
The initiative is based on decades of solidarity and campaign work by Swiss
CSOs and NGOs. Internationally, the best-known organisation campaigning
for fair relations between Switzerland and poorer countries is Public Eye, but
a number of smaller organisations do similar work on a grass-roots level, often
in cooperation with Southern partners. Left-wing politicians have also consist-
ently tried to change policy at a cantonal level, such as Josef Lang from the
Green Alternative Party, or the Young Green Party in the Canton of Zug
where Glencore and many other traders are headquartered. One strategy has
been to bring poor living conditions and human rights violations around
Swiss companies’ plants to people’s attention, an effort in which Swiss public
media have played an important role.
In Zambia, opposition to the mining industry has been present as long as
commercial mining, and labour unions have strongly criticised privatisation in
the s (Larmer , ). The inﬂuence of both labour unions (Uzar
) and civil society has been weakened by liberalisation and lack of funds,
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and by increasing state oppression under the Patriotic Front government since
. NGOs, often foreign-funded, such as Publish What you Pay (PWYP),
ActionAid and Caritas, hold annual national and regional indabas to discuss
the state of the mining sector and, to a limited extent, alternatives to mining
with representatives from industry and government. Against an increasingly
authoritarian state, only a small number of NGOs are in a position to speak
out against the exploitation of the country’s resources, mismanagement and
corruption. While they work under much more difﬁcult conditions than their
Swiss counterparts, such initiatives have presented very important challenges
to mining companies in Zambia.
The most successful of these initiatives is probably the legal case ﬁled by the
widower of Beatrice Mithi. Mithi, Mufulira’s District Commissioner, died after
inhaling sulphur dioxide released by Glencore’s subsidiary Mopani Copper
Mines in . The year before, the Zambia Environment Management
Authority (ZEMA) had found evidence of acid mists harming people and the
environment in the communities of Mufulira and ordered one of Mopani’s
plants to be shut down because of its pollution levels. In , the Kabwe High
Court ruled that sulphur dioxide emissions at the copper plant caused Mithi’s
death, and ordered Glencore’s London-listed subsidiary to pay ,
Zambian Kwacha in damages to the widower (Kabwe High Court ).
Glencore had rejected the claim, citing an environmental indemnity agreement
signed with the Zambian government in . The judge ruled that the agree-
ment did not apply because sulphur dioxide emissions had exceeded legal
limits. Glencore has appealed the ruling at Zambia’s highest court.
Another noteworthy case is not directly connected to Switzerland, but is
closely watched by both civil society and companies as a possibly important pre-
cedent. Lungowe and Others versus Vedanta Resources and Konkola Copper Mines was
ﬁled extraterritorially in a UK court in . With the help of the attorneys’ ﬁrm
Leigh Day, , Zambians allege that as a result of toxic efﬂuent discharge
from the Nchanga Mine in Chingola (Copperbelt), they suffered loss of
income since land and waterways their livelihood depended on were
damaged. They further allege that many suffer personal injuries as a result of
the use of polluted water. The defendants, Vedanta and its subsidiary
Konkola Copper Mines, challenged the jurisdiction of the English courts. In
, after a three-day hearing, the Judge found an English court the most
appropriate forum for the resolution of the claims and allowed the claims to
proceed. The companies’ appeal was dismissed by the Court of Appeal on 
October .
Despite their provisional success, both cases also show that lengthy appeals
processes play in favour of companies since they can easily exhaust the plaintiffs’
resources and patience (Kesselring ). Alliances with Northern NGOs or
with legal ﬁrms who have better resources seem one way of addressing this
inherent imbalance.
Not all Zambian civil society initiatives are as prominent. Many CSOs work on
a local level and never reach beyond their constituencies. One recent example is
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the Mufulira NGO Forum, which demands clean drinking water from Mopani
Copper Mines and campaigns both at the municipality and the mine level. Its
work is partly ﬁnanced by Solifonds, a Swiss NGO founded by the Swiss
Federation of Trade Unions and a number of other institutions, and very
active when it comes to the global role of Swiss companies (Solifonds ).
Other challenges to mining companies originate with the governments of
commodity exporting states. A number of African governments recently intro-
duced new mining codes (e.g. DRC) or issued large bills to companies for out-
standing taxes (e.g. Tanzania and Zambia). In early , the Zambia Revenue
Authority (ZRA) billed FQM for outstanding import duties of US$ million
and associated interest and penalties of US$ billion. ZRA claimed that consum-
ables for use at the Sentinel mine (Kalumbila) were incorrectly classiﬁed as
mining machinery, which do not attract import duties, from January  to
December . FQM refutes the assessment and at the time of writing is con-
ducting its own audit. While some argue that the tax bill is mainly an effort by
the Zambian government to postpone its debt crisis by avoiding outstanding
VAT repayments (Africa Conﬁdential b), the payment made international
headlines and led Moody’s to revise its rating outlook for FQM from stable to
negative.
Such state efforts to curb corporate power today remain on a national level
and often fail due to mining companies’ bargaining power. While the earlier
Zambian system of nationalised mines and nationalised copper marketing
had many problems, it left slightly greater opportunities to lobby for higher
prices and a fairer market environment. The Conseil Intergouvernemental des
Pays Exportateurs de Cuivre (CIPEC), founded in Lusaka in  and ﬁnally dis-
banded in , was a state-led initiative to increase the market power of coun-
tries that depended on copper exports. While CIPEC has never really been
successful (Mikdashi ; Kohler ), even the attempt to form such a
group would face much higher hurdles today. The Zambian government is
highly dependent on the taxes of mining companies. In all aspects of mining
policy, government has to negotiate with multinational companies whose man-
agers are under pressure to lower costs and who can pit different countries
against each other. Despite state efforts to increase the development impact
of mining (see Kesselring a; Saunders & Caramento ), the scope for
government action is narrow, which leaves civil society actors in both
Northern and Southern countries as the most important pressure groups.
Our examples of challenges to extractivism in Zambia and Switzerland show
the importance, but also some problems and limitations of civil society action.
Firstly, all existing initiatives focus on the mining dimension of the companies,
on direct consequences for affected communities and on extraordinary exam-
ples of corporate misbehaving – issues around which meaningful campaigns
can be organised. Tackling everyday business practices and the consequences
of less visible sides of extraction – say, trade, logistics and shipping – is much
harder. Companies’ inner workings remain opaque to outsiders, and the
 G R E G O R D O B L E R A N D R I T A K E S S E L R I N G
available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0022278X19000089
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. WWZ Bibliothek, on 12 Aug 2019 at 13:24:40, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use,
consequences of anonymous market forces are much more difﬁcult to show
than the consequences of, say, an acid spill.
Secondly, civil society groups as well as states struggle with ﬁrms’ transnational
character and their aloofness in a speciﬁc locale. Due to the complex legal struc-
ture of international companies, often no speciﬁc national jurisdiction seems to
be the appropriate place to hold them to task. No transnational judicial body has
the authority to investigate corporate practices across state sovereignties (Bastin
), and due to power imbalances between international mining corpora-
tions and governments, chances for supranational action of exporting countries
seem slim.
Thirdly, in spite of public criticism, Swiss extractivism still enjoys considerable
state support, both in Switzerland and Zambia. Switzerland’s economy is per-
ceived to greatly beneﬁt from transit trade (Beusch et al. ). Zambia in
turn has little choice but to rely on international investors for tax income and
for employment, leaving the government with few resources against corporate
bargaining power.
C O N C L U S I O N : V A L U E C A P T U R E I N G L O B A L E X T R A C T I V I S M
We have traced different ways in which Swiss companies are active in global pro-
duction networks of copper mined in Zambia. Our focus has been very
restricted. We have only analysed the relatively small segment between
mining and Southern African harbours. We have not considered what
happens upstream from mining – say, in mining machinery, supplies, patents
or engineering education; nor have we analysed subsequent processing after
copper leaves the continent. We have completely ignored ﬁnance and insur-
ance, in which Swiss companies play a crucial role globally, and have left aside
the role of Swiss capital invested elsewhere.
Despite such limitations, a clear image has started to emerge. We have learnt
about Switzerland’s role in Zambia’s copper sector and we can learn from it.
What did we learn about Switzerland’s role? First of all: it is more important
than most people, us included, would have assumed. While only one of the ﬁve
major mining companies in Zambia is headquartered in Switzerland, a substan-
tial part of copper trade, logistics, certiﬁcation and to some degree transport is
conducted by Swiss companies. It is very difﬁcult to quantify Swiss involvement;
exact ﬁgures are hard to come by and the ‘Swissness’ of multinational ﬁrms is
often impossible to measure. Yet for a country of just over million inhabitants,
Switzerland certainly plays an outsized role. While the country’s transit trade has
been attracting more scrutiny over the last years, other aspects of Swiss involve-
ment have largely remained unnoticed.
If our data can be generalised, Swiss companies involved in commodity extrac-
tion typically invest in services rather than in extraction itself. Services, unlike
extraction, require a comparatively low or mobile investment and provide
stable proﬁts relatively independent from prices. Techniques and know-how,
which of course are very important for these services, are usually much more
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adaptable to different commodities than is the case for extraction. In short, ser-
vices are more mobile and less dependent on one single country or one single
commodity market than mining.
This tendency towards ﬂexibility explains the avenues in which Swiss services
companies usually expand into developing markets. They acquire successful
local companies and integrate them into a global brand. Through such acquisi-
tions, they can appropriate local expertise and credibility and combine it with
their own global reach and international reputation. This, as well, allows com-
panies to balance different markets against each other, keeping losses local
and appropriating gains (see also Parker et al. : ).
In short: the Swiss service economy can proﬁt from global extraction largely
without suffering from the downsides of extractivist dynamics. Swiss ﬁrms typic-
ally build and maintain the infrastructure of global commodity trade instead of
committing to the big localised investment needed in mining. In doing so, they
continue a long history of Swiss facilitation of global trade, from the slave trade
to apartheid gold.
Not all Swiss companies are the same. Some have originated in Switzerland,
while others have only recently moved there. Different global companies are
attracted by different aspects of the Swiss model as we have described it; some
look for a favourable tax regime and do not need much more than a letterbox
in Zug, while others seek access to the trade and ﬁnance hub and the qualiﬁed
personnel working in it. Some Swiss companies – Glencore or Traﬁgura – are
themselves vertically integrated, extending their limbs into many countries,
while others – Metal Corp – are merely one local part of a global company.
Whatever their role and scope, they can no longer rely on remaining unchal-
lenged. The stark difference in living conditions between Switzerland and many
countries in which Swiss companies are active draws criticism and, increasingly,
calls for regulation and control. The greatest asset of Swiss-based companies,
their ability to bridge markets and extract value from all of them, can then
become a liability. The global connectedness of Swiss companies might also
create conditions under which civil society pressure in Switzerland can create
material changes for people living in other countries.
What do these insights into Swiss–Zambian economic relations teach us about
the economic structures of extractivism?
First of all, it would be a mistake for all people involved – scholars, activists,
regulators – to concentrate on mines and wells alone when trying to understand
extractivism. The sites of extraction are massive, prominent and visible. They
have a huge ecological, economic and social impact. This prominence tends
to hide the infrastructure that enables them to work. The service sector is an
important part of this infrastructure, and one in which a sizeable part of the
proﬁts from extraction can be earned.
Serviciﬁcation affects the distribution of proﬁts as much as the globalisation of
mining does. Economists have argued that asymmetric power structures in
global value chains lead to an uneven distribution of proﬁts (e.g. Milberg
; Heintz ), and that domestic added value can decline with the
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integration into global value chains ‘due to an injection of foreign high-skilled
labor content in their exports’ (Carballo & Jiang ) – a process as clearly
visible in the share of expatriate workers in the higher pay-grades of Zambian
mines as in the reliance of logistics companies on know-how produced in
higher-paying countries. When it comes to mineral extraction in Africa, analyses
of these tendencies have rarely taken the service sector into account. We do not
have sufﬁcient quantitative data to clearly substantiate this, but our qualitative
analysis shows that higher-skilled service tasks that create stable added value
are increasingly taken over by international companies.
These trends change the distribution of proﬁts in global production net-
works. In such networks, a large number of actors in different countries
jointly create value which, when it meets demand on the market, can translate
into proﬁts. The production network does not only organise the cooperation
between the actors; it also is a mechanism to assign a relative value to each of
the actors’ contributions, and to remunerate them accordingly. The different
actors have different capacities to convince others of the value of their activities,
and consequently to capture value within the network.
Dependence on commodity extraction is problematic for poorer countries
for two main reasons. Firstly, it leaves them with only those segments of the pro-
duction network in which relatively little value is (deﬁned as being) produced.
Secondly, a comparatively large percentage of the proﬁt generated even in these
sectors is exported to other national economies as dividend on capital in-
vestment, so that it cannot be invested to develop economic alternatives to
extraction in mining countries.
As our discussion of Switzerland’s role in Zambia shows, both arguments hold
true for the infrastructure of extraction. Between the mines and the harbours, a
great many actors add value to copper – from states building roads and railways
to logistics companies to truck drivers, ﬁlling-station attendants, security guards
or roadside food sellers. Each of them creates value, but their ability to capture
parts of the overall value creation widely differs. Swiss companies are among
those who have been most successful in getting a share of the value added to
copper between its extraction and its use in industrial production. Their com-
petitive advantages allow them to ﬂexibly invest in the most lucrative segments
of copper’s production networks. As a consequence, they are able to generate
and appropriate an increasing part of the proﬁts generated in the Southern
African segments of copper’s value chain – proﬁts that then improve lives on
the shores of Lake Zug, not in Zambia.
The preconditions for Switzerland’s favourable place in global commodity
chains are know-how, access to ﬁnance, global reputation and not least political
stability. These have also turned the country into a centre of international orga-
nisations and global regulation – a proximity that again creates an advantage for
companies based there. All these advantages allow Swiss companies to control
essential parts of copper’s global production network, and to generate a great
amount of proﬁts on the way.
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The unequal distribution of proﬁts should also make governments think twice
about the usefulness of infrastructure projects that link the sites of extraction to
global markets (Nugent ). They might increase economic activity, but
without additional changes, the odds are that global companies will earn the
windfalls while national taxpayers will face the debts (Kesselring , b).
Mining has often been presented as a dirty business linked to environmental
degradation, human rights violations, corruption and tax evasion. Civil society
and at least in part governmental actors have focused on such problems. The
case study we discussed shows that, while such a focus on corrupt practices is
important, civil society should also discuss the normalised uneven allocation
of proﬁts, wages, taxes and beneﬁts. In the ﬁnancialised global economy,
capital owners’ shares in proﬁts have been increasing for decades. Since the
capital invested in extractive industries and related services generally comes
from rich Northern countries, this has also shifted the balance of proﬁts
between the global North and the global South. Attempts to redress this shift
and to increase the share of proﬁts remaining in a commodity exporting
country can use each of the classic factors of production as a lever: land by
increasing mining royalties, labour by negotiating better wages, higher-paying
jobs or higher rates of employment, and capital by increasing either taxes or
ownership. Zambia has tried, and failed, on all these fronts, and in spite of
the commercial success of its mining sector, the country is confronted with
increasing economic insecurity.
For Switzerland, Zambia’s mining industry has had the opposite effect. Swiss
companies have found lucrative, low-risk investment opportunities in Zambia by
targeting mineral logistics and trade. Mining in Zambia thus creates a steady
stream of income for companies registered in Switzerland, while much of the
economic, political and environmental costs of mining are borne by Zambians.
N O T E S
. Some of the information in this article comes from, or was corroborated by, interviews with senior
management at Kansanshi mine owned by First Quantum Minerals (FQM). For a period in , we
had access to a number of senior employees and managers. The interviews were taped with the intervie-
wees’ consent. When we approached the mine’s general manager for an interview, however, he denied
the request. He made clear that interviewees, in his view, had violated internal procedures by speaking
to us without authorisation by FQM’s board. As a consequence, we have decided to use the material
obtained through freely given interviews, without however giving the names of interviewees or assigning
quotes. Much of the information given in the interviews was corroborated by other sources.
. Mistakidis resigned as Glencore’s head of global copper trading by the end of  amid inquiries
of Ontario’s Security Commission and the US Department of Justice about Glencore’s Katanga mines.
See e.g. Bloomberg () and Canadian Lawyer ().
. Handelszeitung (). Most of these companies have different seats; Cargill mainly operates from
Minnesota, USA, while Traﬁgura has its headquarters in Singapore. The ﬁgures reﬂect the ofﬁcial Swiss
economic statistics about companies based in the country.
. ‘Glencore has a %off-take agreement with Mopani for the life of the mines, with ownership trans-
ferred to Glencore at the mine gate and pricing based on LME prices’, according to Glencore’s  IPO
prospectus (Glencore : ). See also footnote  in the OECD complaint Sherpa et al vs Glencore
International AG (OECDWatch ).
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. According to the LinkedIn proﬁle of its trafﬁc manager. We were unable to independently verify the
company’s ownership.
. Through bill of lading service has two main advantages for Zambian customers: It guarantees access
to empty containers for loading (since Zambia does not have an empty container depot, containers used by
independent shippers have to be pre-ordered from South Africa, often at several weeks’ notice); and it
shifts the risk of demurrage (ﬁnes paid for late arrival of goods loaded on vessels) to the transporters
hired by the carrier. None of these advantages is usually worth its cost for high volume copper transport
through warehouses. – On MSC’s role in shipbreaking, one of the endpoints of copper’s value chain,
see Daems & Goris ().
. Sonangol and the entourage of José Eduardo dos Santos are linked to Switzerland in different ways,
allegedly using its banks as conduits for money gained in corrupt deals. In spite of several charges, no Swiss
court has so far found anyone guilty in this regard; e.g. OSISA ().
. An important example is Res Gehriger’s television contributions, which helped to expose excessive
pollution by Glencore’s smelter in Mufulira – see SRF (, ).
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